This paper analyzes the political economics of the composition of taxes. Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure, and the median voter is pivotal in the theoretical framework analyzed. As in Meltzer and Richard (1981) income taxes increase with inequality. Conversely expenditure taxes …rst increase and then decrease with increasing inequality. The extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure unambiguously rises with inequality. Cross-country data exhibit a robust positive correlation between the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure, and inequality. Consistent with the theory this relationship holds most signi…cantly in stronger democracies.
Introduction
What determines …scal policy in democracies? A canonical theoretical result derived by Meltzer and Richard (1981) , building on Romer (1975) , is that the size of government increases with the degree of inequality in the pre-tax income distribution.
Cross country evidence testing the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis is predominantly unsupportive. For example Perotti (1996) , Bassett et al (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) all …nd that the size of government is either insigni…cantly and/or negatively related to measures of inequality. In response, new theories have emerged through which high levels of inequality can coexist with small government under democracy.
1 Benabou and Ok (2001) advanced the possibility that the prospect of upward income mobility may limit the demand for redistribution under rational expectations. Nonetheless, the 'Great Gatsby curve' (Krueger, 2012) undermines this argument somewhat as a full reconciliation with the data.
In the cross-country context there are many potential determinants of the total size of government, beyond the income distribution. Socioeconomic, historical and institutional di¤erences may account for observed di¤erences in government size, and indeed undoubtedly also co-determine di¤erences in the income distribution. The broader literature on the size of government catalogues income levels (Wagner's law, analyzed in Ram, 1987) , ideology (Pickering and Rockey, 2011) , demographic change (Razin et al 2002) , openness (Rodrik, 1998) , country size (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and fragmentation (Alesina et al, 1999) .
Public choice theory characterizes the size of government as the outcome of the power of a 1 For example Persson (1995) and Benabou (2000) .
1 bureaucracy that has the capacity to sustain itself (Niskanen, 1971) , which also may di¤er across institutional settings. Persson and Tabellini (1999) and stress the importance of constitutional rules in determining government size. Shelton (2007) provides an extensive survey and examination of this literature.
Consequently an alternative empirical literature instead focusses on testing the hypothesis within countries. Meltzer and Richard (1983) found some support for their hypothesis using data from the US states, and relatedly Alesina et al (2000) found that public employment was higher in US cities with greater levels of inequality. Borge and Rattsø (2004) found that the tax burden shifts from poll taxes to property taxes with greater income inequality across
Norwegian local governments.
This paper revisits international evidence, but …rst asks a di¤erent, but basic, question:
how does inequality a¤ect the composition of taxes? Arguably total expenditure (and therefore total taxation under a balanced budget) may be determined institutionally, or more generally by factors other than the income distribution. But the total size of government is not the only policy lever. Even if the size of the public sector is taken as given, governments still face unresolved questions on the appropriate composition of taxes. Perhaps the most basic question here is the extent to which government raise taxes on income as opposed to expenditure. Indeed Crawford et al (2007) write that "(t)he appropriate balance between direct and indirect taxation -between income taxes and taxes on goods and services -is one of the oldest issues in public …nance, but still imperfectly understood." There is of course an enormous literature analyzing optimal taxation, beginning with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) , but very little indeed in the way of a positive analysis of the political economics of the tax composition decision.
A related literature examines the adoption of particular tax instruments, both historically Jensen, 2009a and 2009b) and as an outcome or indeed a driver of the development process (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2014) . However, this literature generally neglects the impact of inequality on the adoption process.
In this paper the composition of taxes is determined in a simple median voter framework.
Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure. There are di¤erent tax collection costs (or deadweight losses) associated with both, but income taxes are more e¤ective at redistributing than expenditure taxes. Because the median voter's income is less than their expenditure, a given level of additional redistribution costs more to them in consumption terms when …nanced by expenditure taxes than by income taxes. In the theoretical framework the preferred policy of the median voter is the unique Condorcet winner, despite the fact there are two policy instruments, because across individuals the ideal policy mix is unidimensional in income. 2 The results relating to income taxes are familiar. As with Meltzer and Richard (1981) greater inequality monotonically leads to higher income taxes. The results relating to expenditure taxes are novel. At low levels of inequality, increases in inequality also lead to higher tax rates because these are also redistributive (because the rich spend more than the poor hence pay more taxes), and at low tax levels the deadweight losses are relatively small. However, once inequality passes some threshold level, then there is a stronger desire for redistribution, even if this comes at the price of greater deadweight income-tax losses.
The median voter now substitutes expenditure taxes for income taxes. Nonetheless, an unambiguous …nding is that the composition of taxes, de…ned as the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure, will always rise with inequality.
Using cross-country data for tax composition from the WDI, and inequality data from the Texas Inequality Project, there is a robust positive correlation between the extent to which taxes are levied on earnings relative to expenditure and inequality. Moreover income taxes as a percentage of total taxes increase, whilst taxes on expenditure as a percentage of total taxes fall with increased inequality. The magnitude of the estimated e¤ects are quite large. A one-standard deviation increase in inequality is associated with an increase in the ratio of taxes collected from income to taxes collected from expenditure of around half a standard deviation. These statistical relationships hold most signi…cantly in countries with higher levels of democracy, in support of the mechanism proposed in this paper.
The next section provides a theoretical analysis of the political economics of income and expenditure taxation. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis and section 4 concludes.
Model
The model is a simple extension of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to include expenditure taxes.
As in that paper, expenditure (x i ) is set equal to disposable income,
where t y is the income tax rate, y i is income, indexed i across the population and r is per capita redistribution. Consumption (c i ) is less than expenditure, because of the presence of 4 an expenditure/consumption tax (t c ), hence
The budget is assumed to balance so that redistribution in per capita terms is …nanced from consumption and income tax revenue, requiring
Furthermore at the aggregate level income equals expenditure, thus
In order to maintain tractability the labor-supply decision is not formally modeled, hence maximization of utility amounts to maximization of consumption (because consumption is the only argument in the utility function). The pivotal voter/policymaker thus chooses the triple q = ft c ; t y ; rg in order to maximize their own consumption. Substituting in (4), (3) and (1) into (2) gives
hence the policy problem reduces to two dimensions (t c and t y ). The important point of departure from Meltzer and Richard (1981) is that there are now two tax instruments being set. In general the Condorcet winner does not exist when the policy problem has two (or more) dimensions, but the structure presented can be re-expressed in terms of (unidimen-5 sional) intermediate preferences which means that the choice of the median voter will be pivotal.
3 Grandmont (1978) showed that as long as voters only di¤er along one dimension (here, income), and that the indirect utility function (W (q; y i )) can be written as
then the choice of the median voter is a Condorcet winner. Clearly (5) conforms to (6). It is clear that equation (5) satis…es this requirement.
A …nal ingredient of the model is that mean income declines with taxes, capturing tax collection and/or 'deadweight'costs. To model this we follow Pickering and Rockey (2011) and posit that _ y = y 1 y t y y y c t c y y
where y is potential income and y and c are parameters de…ning the sensitivity of actual (taxable) income respectively to income and consumption taxes. The parameters y and c represent deadweight losses, either incurred directly as the tax collection costs, and/or indirectly in terms of their e¤ects on economic activity. These losses are non-negative, but in order to generate a meaningful policy tension are less than the tax revenue that may be raised, hence 0 < y < 1 and 0 < c < 1. y in particular may vary across countries. High values could imply high income tax collection costs or a low income tax base. As discussed by Besley and Persson (2014) , many countries cannot easily collect income taxes. Arguably both c and y may be higher in the presence of a signi…cant informal economy. Whilst the informal economy is not modeled here, it is intuitive that it is more di¢ cult to levy taxes (which would apply by construction to the formal sector) when the economic agents within the formal sector may easily migrate to the informal economy.
_ y, which here represents the formal economy, would fall more readily with increased taxation. 4 Nonetheless, across groups of countries that are economically and institutionally similar, one might expect that the cost parameters are also similar.
The median voter has income y m , and we de…ne m _ y ym > 1. Maximization of (5) with respect to t y , given (7) yields
This immediately delivers the well-known Meltzer and Richard (1981) that the total size of government (i.e. t c + t y ) is increasing in inequality. Moreover when choosing t y for given t c the two instruments can be understood as perfect substitutes. Higher t c permits lower t y .
However, t c is not a given.
Maximization of (5) with respect to t c , and using (8), yields
Note that no restrictions are required in order to ensure t c < 1. It is trivially clear from (5) that the median voter will will not want to set expenditure taxes in excess of 100% as this will mean negative consumption.
. For the median voter to desire positive expenditure taxes at all, there has to be a wedge between y and c . Were y and c equal, then income taxes would always (i.e. irrespective of m) be the preferred policy 4 La Porta and Shleifer (2014) also argue that agents choose informality as a means of avoiding tax.
7 instrument. The reason for this is that when both types of tax are applied with equal cost (i.e. both incur the same output loss) then the only concern left is redistribution. Given the structure of the tax system, income taxes are inherently more redistributive (dollar for dollar) than consumption taxes. The latter always incur a cost to expenditure, which exceed the cost in terms of (own) income when income taxes are applied. However, when y > c , then the policy decision becomes more complex. Incomes taxes may be more redistributive, but if the costs are prohibitive, then it becomes optimal for the median voter to choose consumption taxes.
Combining equations (8) and (9) yields
As per Meltzer and Richard (1981) . The proof of this is in the appendix. The intuition here is that y is high enough such that income taxes will not be maximally set.
5
The ratio of income to expenditure taxes is given by
The derivative of this expression with respect to m is unambiguously positive given 0 < c < y < 1. 6 Increases in inequality lead to increases in income taxes relative to con-5 This can also be viewed as a shorthand for the plausible general equilibrium result in Meltzer and Richard (1981) that the labor supply will be su¢ ciently elastic at high income tax rates.
6 Details are in the appendix. 8 sumption taxes. The reason is that as inequality increases, then greater weight is placed on redistribution through income taxes for given tax collection (or deadweight output losses)
costs.
It is also of interest to consider how income and expenditure taxes separately respond to increases in inequality. The more straightforward case is income taxes. In this instance there is no ambiguity: income taxes increase with inequality (
with exactly the same underpinning as that provided in Meltzer and Richard (1981) (who only consider income taxes).
On the other hand the response consumption taxes to increasing inequality is ambiguous.
Taking for simplicity the case of c = 0, the derivative of (9) with respect to m is positive or negative depending on
Note that the …rst term is unambiguously negative, hence . At levels of inequality below this, increases in inequality lead to higher consumption taxes. At levels beyond the threshold, increases in inequality lead to lower consumption taxes. The intuition for this non-monotonicity lies in the fact that income taxes are more redistributive than consumption taxes. Both instruments achieve redistribution, but at low levels of inequality the median voter's income is comparatively close to mean income and the redistributive di¤erence (at least for the median voter) between the two instruments is relatively small. Here increases in inequality result in both types of tax increasing, with the extent depending on the collection costs or deadweight losses associated with each instrument. As inequality increases, a stronger tension between the two instruments arises and the median voter becomes disposed towards income taxes to the extent that they now substitute for consumption taxes. Even if income taxes entail higher deadweight losses, they are still preferred because of their capacity to redistribute.
Figure 1 depicts how taxes change with inequality under the (arbitrary) parameterization y = 0:9 and c = 0:3. The position of these curves change with these parameters, but the key properties always hold given the conditions outlined. Income taxes monotonically increase a la Meltzer and Richard (1981) , whilst expenditure taxes …rst increase and then decrease with inequality. Note also that the gradient of the income tax curve is always higher than that of the expenditure tax curve, hence d dm > 0 at all levels of inequality.
The model in this section is very stylized and omits several key features of any realworld tax system. For example the marginal propensity to consume may fall with income.
This particular consideration would render the expenditure tax as regressive rather than proportionate as above. 7 In a median voter model this would lead to (an augmentation of) a negative relationship between consumption taxes and inequality. Hence the prediction that increases with inequality would hold more strongly were this feature incorporated into the model.
Recent literature has highlighted the role that institutions such as the voting rule (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001 and Persson and Tabellini, 1999) or form of government may play in determining policy, and in particular the size of government. These mechanisms, and mechanisms highlighting the role of inequality (as in the present paper)
are not mutually exclusive. For example, one possibility could be that institutions determine the total budget, whilst inequality determines the composition of taxes.
Other generalizations of the model could include a richer (more progressive?) set of income tax instruments and thresholds, and indeed also analyze the tax collection costs (or deadweight losses) more fully.
Despite its simplicity, the model still sheds light on the tax composition decision in a median voter model. The results relating to income taxes are familiar, with income taxes rising as before-tax inequality rises. The results relating to expenditure taxes are more novel. In particular when inequality is initially at low levels, then increased inequality will also lead to increased demand for expenditure taxes. The rich spend more, and greater taxes will serve to redistribute towards the poor. However, this mechanism is eroded as inequality increases.
Tax levels and associated collection costs increase. The median voter now replaces expenditure taxes with income taxes and beyond a certain threshold of inequality further increases in inequality lead to reductions in expenditure taxes. Nonetheless, it is unambiguous that the ratio of income taxes to expenditure taxes increases as inequality increases.
Evidence
The main agenda here is to ask whether the composition of taxes across countries systematically changes with inequality. Cross-country income and expenditure tax revenue data are available from the World Development Indicators through 1990-2012. Despite over 20 years of data, there is much greater variation in the policy data, as well as in the inequality data discussed below, across countries than within countries. 8 Consequently we report results from cross-country regressions using within-country averages. This at least has the advantage of removing any cyclicality from the data, which could also endogenously vary with inequality.
The main dependent variable is constructed from the ratio of the percentage of tax revenue taken from taxes on income, pro…ts and capital gains and the percentage of tax revenue taken from taxes on goods and services, i.e. = t y t c = Taxes on income, pro…ts and capital gains (% of revenue) Taxes on goods and services (% of revenue)
where both the numerator and denominator are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Because in practice rates vary with di¤erent forms of income (and at di¤erent levels of income) and goods across countries, the aggregate measure here is a means of gauging the extent of taxes on income relative to taxes on expenditure. In the regression analysis below we use the natural logarithm of because there are a small number of outliers where the denominator in (12) is quite small.
As well as examining how ln ( ) varies with inequality we also separately analyze how the separate tax measures are respectively a¤ected by inequality. The model above unambiguously predicts a positive impact of inequality on ln ( ) and t y , whilst the e¤ect on t c is ambiguous.
The inequality measure used in the empirical analysis is the University of Texas Inequality
Project's estimate of household income inequality (Galbraith and Kum, 2005) . These data (denoted U T IP ) are constructed using Theil's T statistic to measure pay inequality across variable (ln ( ) -described below) the standard deviation of the cross-country means is 1.02, whilst the average within-country standard deviation is 0.261.
sectors in each country.
One important determinant of the capacity to tax is the level of development, so a …rst control variables used in the regression analysis is the natural log of GDP per capita in constant chained PPP US$ (ln _ y ) from the Penn World Tables. OECD membership (OECD) is also used as a further control, also to some extent capturing the level of development and institutional capacity. Because the alternative tax instruments may redistribute across generations to di¤ering extents, demographic variables (the proportion of the population aged 15-64 and the proportion aged 65 and above) are also included in the analysis (denoted P ROP 1564 and P ROP 65). These data are all taken from the WDI.
Countries raise tax revenue through means beyond taxation on income and goods and services. One important source is revenue from customs and other import duties. For this reason the trade share (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP -denoted T RADE)
is also included in the regression analysis. In addition to these controls the log of the total population size (ln (P OP ), also from the WDI) is also included, to account for any scale (dis-)economies associated with particular types of tax collection.
9
A …nal control variable is the quality of democratic institutions. The degree of democracy may a¤ect policy variables directly, through channels other than that analyzed above, or indeed indirectly as a proxy for tax capacity. For this reason the P OLIT Y 2 democracy score is included in the regression analysis as standard. Moreover the median income earner more plausibly drives policy under pure democracy. For this reason the sample is split into countries which score highly on this measure and those that do not. The expectation is that inequality will be more strongly related to the policy variables in the more democratic 9 Both the trade data and the population data come from the World Development Indicators.
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subsample. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the analysis below.
Note …rst that there is considerable dispersion in both the tax variables. Countries di¤er meaningfully in terms of how they raise tax revenue. Across the whole sample, taxes on goods and services represent a higher fraction of total revenue than taxes on income. This re ‡ects the fact that in low income countries, the capacity to raise income taxes is often limited. Indeed within the OECD members, income taxes are around 32% of revenue, whilst in the rest of the World income taxes are just 20% of revenue. These data are also consistent with Besley and Persson (2014) .
The U T IP data cover 129 countries, and numerically range from below 30 (the Czech Republic and Sweden) to 58.2 (Angola), with higher numbers representing greater inequality.
Notably, these data are negatively correlated with GDP per capita, with a Pearson correlation coe¢ cient of 0:66. Richer countries are measured (on average) to be more equal than poorer countries (see Galbraith, 2008 for a discussion). This highlights the importance of controlling for economic development, else the inequality measure will be proxying for other potential drivers of policy.
Before presenting the main results we …rst report regressions, in Table 2 , where the size of government, as measured by average total tax revenue as a share of GDP, is regressed on inequality. This serves to recapitulate the consensus on the empirical evidence, or rather the lack of it, relating to the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis that the total size of government increases with before-tax income inequality. Column 1 is a simple regression with just inequality (U T IP ) and GDP per capita used as regressors. In that regression, as well as column 2, in which the full controls are used, the size of government is not signi…cantly correlated with inequality. 10 Signi…cance levels do not improve when the sample is split by the quality of democracy. Column 3 contains results for countries with strong democratic credentials, with an average polity2 democracy score of 7 or above through the sample period. 11 Column 4 contains results for countries with polity2 democracies scores of less than 7. In neither instance is any statistical relationship found between the size of government and inequality. These …nding re ‡ects those found for example in Perotti (1996) , Bassett et al (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) .
12 Table 3 contains results when ln ( ) is used as the dependent variable. When looking at the full sample both excluding (column 1) and including (column 2) control variables there is a statistically signi…cant positive association between the extent to which countries use income taxes relative to expenditure taxes and inequality. When the sample is separated according to P OLIT Y 2 ? 7 (columns 3 and 4) it becomes clear that the positive relationship holds only under democratic regimes. This is consistent with the theory above, which relies on a complete franchise. If the median voter earns more than the median income then their inclination towards redistribution will be much weaker. When the democracy criterion is strengthened further, so that only countries with P OLIT Y 2 > 8 (column 5), the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient increases and is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.
Using the coe¢ cient estimate from column 5 of table 3, a one standard deviation increase in inequality, as measured by U T IP , is statistically associated with an increase of 0.46 in the policy variable ln ( ), holding all else equal. Given that this is nearly a half of the raw standard deviation in the policy variable, the magnitude of the estimated correlation is sizable.
One possible concern with these results is the presence of outliers. To check sensitivity to these we computed DFFITS measures for each observation used in column 5 of table 3 following the procedure detailed in Welsch and Kuh (1977) . Four observations exhibits DFFITS measures greater than one in magnitude -Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria and the US.
Omission of any one, or indeed all four of these outliers does not change the results substantively. In all cases the estimated coe¢ cient is positive with comparable magnitude and remains signi…cant at the 1% level.
In Tables 4 and 5 results are presented respectively for t y and t c , the numerator and denominator in (12). In Table 4 the …ndings for income taxes (t y ) are quite similar to the results found for ln ( ). Increases in inequality are generally found to be positively related with the extent to which income taxes are used within total taxes, but moreso in the stronger democracies. In countries where P OLIT Y 2 7, the estimated e¤ect remains positive, though is not statistically signi…cant, whilst in countries where P OLIT Y 2 < 7, the estimated relationship is in fact negative, though at a very weak signi…cance level. When the stronger democratic requirement is applied (i.e. where P OLIT Y 2 8), the estimated e¤ect increases and is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. Using the estimate of column 5, a one standard deviation increase in inequality, is statistically associated with an increase of 6.46 in t y , holding all else equal. As with ln ( ), this represent about half of a standard deviation in the policy variable, so again the magnitude of the estimated correlation is sizable.
In the case of income taxes, some of the results relating to the control variables are of interest. The proportion of the population aged over 65 years is consistently negatively related to income taxes. This is consistent with the …ndings of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who found a robust negative relationship between labor tax rates and the dependency ratio. Another regularity in Table 4 is the positive relationship with income per capita. As discussed in Besley and Persson (2014) this likely re ‡ects the greater capacity to tax in richer countries. A further result is that the extent of democracy is positively associated with the extent to which income taxes are used. If income taxes (relative to other forms of taxation)
are more progressive, then given the plausible assumption that democratization means that the median voter becomes relatively poorer, then this relationship would be expected. Table 5 presents the results relating to t c , the extent to which taxes raised through expenditure on goods and services as a percentage of total revenue. In contrast to income taxes, increases in inequality are generally found to be negatively related with the extent to which expenditure taxes are used, especially in the stronger democracies. In countries where P OLIT Y 2 7, the estimated relationship is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level, whilst in countries where P OLIT Y 2 8, the estimated e¤ect is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. Arguably this could re ‡ect a compositional e¤ect: greater t y must mean less taxes raised elsewhere as a percentage of the total, hence correlations may be reversed for t c . Nonetheless, because there are other meaningful sources of revenue the results for t c are not just simply a mirror image for t y . Indeed the raw correlation between the two data series used is only 0:08 (for the subsample of democracies with P OLIT Y 2 8 it is still only 0:18).
Using the estimate of column 5 of Table 5 , a one standard deviation increase in inequality is statistically associated with an reduction of 5.06 in t c , holding all else equal. This represent 38% of a standard deviation in t c , so whilst this is slightly less than that found for t y this is still a sizable e¤ect.
Again the results relating to the control variables are of worthy of some discussion. In contrast to income taxes there is a negative relationship with income per capita -likely re ‡ecting tax capacity, and the ability to raise taxes through income taxes in particular.
However, there are also some interesting di¤erences between the results for t y and t c . For example, unlike the case of income taxes the demographic variables are not consistently related with t c . There is also a consistent negative relationship between t c and trade (though this relationship is not statistically strong). Globalization may constrain countries'capacity to tax goods and services -indeed arguably this puts more pressure on countries without the capacity to tax elsewhere (see Khattry and Rao, 2002, and Baunsgaard and .
Interestingly, and as found with t y the extent of democracy is positively associated with the extent to which expenditure taxes are used. Essentially revenue sources outside of t y and t c are increasingly relied upon, the weaker the level of democracy. Given that both forms of taxes are progressive (in the weak sense that both instruments require the rich to pay more), this …nding is consistent with the model presented above.
In relation to income taxes the theory above generates an unambiguous hypothesis.
Greater inequality results in greater use of income taxes as a source of revenue. The data are supportive of this hypothesis, at least in strong democracies. However, the hypothesis relating to how taxes on expenditure are related to inequality are more nuanced. Increases in inequality are proposed to increase expenditure tax rates at low levels of inequality, and once some threshold level of inequality is reached, then the relationship becomes negative. In the empirical analysis the relationship is unambiguously negative. To test for this potential non-monotonicity a quadratic term in U T IP is included in the analysis. Table 6 contains the results, in column 1 for the full sample, in column 2 for countries with P OLIT Y 2 7 and in column 3 for countries with P OLIT Y 2 8. In all three cases the estimated sign on the point estimate for the linear term (U T IP ) is positive, whilst the sign on the point estimate for the quadratic term (U T IP 2 ) is negative, consistent with the theory above. However, in all three cases the results are statistically insigni…cant.
One possible way of reconciling these results with the model would be to argue that the observed inequality levels in the sample predominantly (or completely) exceed the threshold value in the model. It is also possible that the model fails to fully account for the e¤ect of inequality on expenditure taxes. As noted towards the end of Section 2 the marginal propensity to consume may fall with income, which could lead to an unambiguous negative relationship. More mundanely, it is also possible that identi…cation of a clear non-linear relationship would go beyond the capacity of the available data.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes how the composition of taxes is determined in a simple median voter framework. Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure, as in the case of a sales tax.
In the framework used the median voter is a Condorcet winner despite the fact there are two policy instruments. The results relating to income taxes are familiar. As with Meltzer and Richard (1981) greater inequality monotonically leads to higher income taxes.
The results relating to expenditure taxes are novel. At low levels of inequality, increases in inequality lead to higher expenditure tax rates. Even though expenditure taxes are not as e¤ective at redistributing as income taxes, there is still a redistributive impetus embodied within an expenditure tax, as the rich spend more than the poor. If expenditure taxes are preferred for separate reasons, perhaps because of smaller deadweight losses or collection costs, then the standard argument -that greater inequality leads to higher taxes -also applies to expenditure taxes.
However, once inequality passes some threshold level, then there is a stronger desire for redistribution, even if this comes at the price of greater deadweight losses. The median voter now substitutes income taxes for expenditure taxes. Nonetheless, an unambiguous …nding is that the composition of taxes, de…ned as the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure, will rise with inequality.
Using cross-country data for tax composition from the WDI, and inequality data from the Texas Inequality Project, there is a robust positive correlation between the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure and inequality. Moreover income taxes as a proportion of total taxes increase with inequality, whilst expenditure taxes as a proportion of total taxes fall with inequality. Given the nature of cross-country data, and in particular unobserved heterogeneity across countries, it is not possible to say that these are causal relationships. Nonetheless, the fact that the empirical results hold most strongly for countries with higher levels of democracy, is supportive of the mechanism proposed in this paper.
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Proof that t y < 1.
Using (10), then t y < 1 requires that
In turn this implies:
Substituting 
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Simplifying yields the condition y c + ( y + c ) (1 ( y c )) > 0 which unambiguously holds given 0 < c < y < 1.
Proof that dty dm > 0.
Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to m leads to the condition
where X y (m + 1) c (m 1). After some algebra, this can be rearranged as
This unambiguously holds given 0 < c < y < 1 < m. The data are within-country averages between 1990-2014. t y denotes taxes on income, pro…ts and capital gains (as a % of revenue) -taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI). t c denotes taxes on goods and services (as a % of revenue) -also taken from the WDI. = ty tc . _ y is real GDP at chained PPPs in millions of 2005 US dollars per capita -taken from the Penn World Tables. U T IP is the University of Texas Inequality Project estimate of household income inequality P ROP 1564 and P ROP 65 are respectively the proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64, and 65 and above. T RADE is imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. OECD is a dummy variable denoting OECD membership. P OP is the country population size P OLIT Y 2 is a measure of democracy provided by the Polity IV project, with 10 denoting the highest level of democracy, and -10 denoting the highest level of autocracy. y , P ROP 1564, P ROP 65, T RADE; ln (P OP ) and P OLIT Y 2 as control variables described in the text. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote signi…cance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
